Structural Causal Models

introduction

Wouter van Amsterdam

2024-08-06

Wouter van Amsterdam — WvanAmsterdam — vanamsterdam.github.io



Table of contents

- DAG-recap
- Structural Causal Models: definitions
- Identification
- Defining counterfactuals and the causal hierarchy (of questions)



Wouter van Amsterdam — WvanAmsterdam — vanamsterdam.github.io



DAG-recap



In past lectures on DAGs

- 1. causal directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) encode assumptions on what variables cause what
- 2. an intervention is defined as a mutilation of this DAG where the treatment variable no longer 'listens' to its parents
- 3. a causal effect is the effect of an intervention
- 4. DAG patterns:
 - fork (confounding)
 - chain (mediation)
 - collider
- 5. typically:
- condition on confounders, don't condition on mediators or colliders
- 6. in more complex DAGs, use d-separation to check identifyability 7. backdoor criterion
 - Wouter van Amsterdam WvanAmsterdam vanamsterdam.github.io



In this lecture: structural causal models (SCMs)

$$U_Z, U_T, U_Y \sim p(U)$$
$$Z = f_Z(U_Z)$$
$$T = f_T(Z, U_T)$$
$$Y = f_Y(T, Z, U_Y)$$



Wouter van Amsterdam — WvanAmsterdam — vanamsterdam.github.io



Why SCMs?

- With DAGs we can:
 - express (non-parametric) prior knowledge
 - understand that seeing \neq doing
 - know what variables to condition on for estimating treatment effect
- However,
 - DAGs and RCTs do not cover all causal questions
 - SCMs go a level deeper than DAGs
 - DAGs naturally 'arise' from SCMs
 - some questions are not identified when only specifying a DAG, but we may have additional information that can lead to identification
 - understand 'identifyability'
 - SCM thinking aligns [^according to me] with physical thinking about the world and is a natural way to think about causality









Topics of today

- SCMs: the world as computer programs
- interventions are submodels
- bonus queries:
 - counterfactuals
- Pearl Causal Hierarchy
- reflections on DAGs, limitations



Structural Causal Models: definitions

Wouter van Amsterdam – WvanAmsterdam – vanamsterdam.github.io



Think of the world as a computer program with a set of

- (endogenous) *variables*:
 - surgery = duration of surgery (hours)
 - los = length of stay in hospital post surgery (days)
 - survival = survival time (years)
- *background variables* (exogenous):
 - u_surgery, u_los, u_survival
- *functions* f for each *variable* which depend on its *parents* pa and its own *background* u:
 - surgery = f_surgery(pa_surgery,u_surgery)
 - los = f_los(pa_los, u_los)
 - survival = f_survival(pa_survival, u_survival)

Together these define a *Structural Causal Model* (see definition 7.1.1 in Pearl 2009, and further) (notation: $M = \langle U, V, F \rangle$)



Structural Causal Model 1

```
1 f_surgery <- function(u_surgery) { # pa_surgery = {}</pre>
 2
     u surgery
 3 }
 4 f_los <- function(surgery, u_los) { # pa_los = {surgery}</pre>
     surgery + u_los
 5
 6 }
 7 f_survival <- function(surgery, los, u_survival) { # pa_survival = {sugery, los}</pre>
     survival = los - 2 * surgery + u_survival
 8
 9 }
10
   scm1 <- function(u_surgery, u_los, u_survival) {</pre>
11
     surgery = f_surgery(u_surgery)
12
              = f_los(surgery, u_los)
13
     los
     survival = f_survival(surgery, los, u_survival)
14
     c(surgery=surgery, los=los, survival=survival)
15
16 }
17 scm1(2, 1, 5)
              los survival
surgery
      2
                3
                         4
```





Recursive Structural Causal Models imply a Directed Acyclic Graph

An SCM is *recursive*, i.e. *acyclic* when following the chain of parents, you never end up at the same variable twice

```
1 scm1 <- function(u_surgery, u_los, u_survival) {
2 surgery = f_surgery(u_surgery)
3 los = f_los(surgery, u_los)
4 survival = f_survival(surgery, los, u_survival)
5 c(surgery=surgery, los=los, survival=survival)
6 }</pre>
```



cted Acyclic Graph you never end up at the

Z =surgery duration



Recursive Structural Causal Models imply a Directed Acyclic Graph

An SCM is *recursive*, i.e. *acyclic* when following the chain of parents, you never end up at the same variable twice



T =length of stay

cted Acyclic Graph you never end up at the

Z = surgery duration



Recursive Structural Causal Models imply a Directed Acyclic Graph

An SCM is *recursive*, i.e. *acyclic* when following the chain of parents, you never end up at the same variable twice



scm1 (without specifying the f_s) and the DAG are equivalent (they describe the same knowledge of the world)

for the remainder, we assume recursiveness



Submodel and Effect of Action

• **submodel**: in scm1 replace f_los with a specific *value*, e.g. 7 days

```
submodel7 <- function(u_surgery, u_los, u_survival) {</pre>
    surgery = f_surgery(u_surgery)
2
3
   los = 7
   survival = f_survival(surgery, los, u_survival)
4
    c(surgery=surgery, los=los, survival=survival)
5
  }
6
7
8 submodel7(2, 1, 5)
             los survival
surgery
      2
             7
                        8
```

• effect of action: resulting SCM of submodel (notation: $M_x = \langle U, V, F_x \rangle$)





The DAG describes a submodel where T no longer 'listens' to any variables but is controlled to be equal to a specific value (e.g. 7)

The *Effect of Action* do(X = x) is defined as the submodel M_x .



Specifying a distribution for exogenous variables U

- Exogenous variables U represent random variation in the world.
- We can specify a *distribution* for them (e.g. Gaussian, Uniform)

```
1 sample_u <- function() {
2     u_surgery = runif(1, 2, 8)
3     u_los = runif(1, -1, 7)
4     u_survival = runif(1, 8, 13)
5     c(u_surgery=u_surgery, u_los=u_los, u_survival=u_survival)
6 }
7 sample_u()
u_surgery u_los u_survival
5,299693 4,308564 12,199266</pre>
```

NM2



Figure 1: 1000 random samples of U



A Probabilistic Causal Model is a SCM with a distribution over U





Figure 2: Realisations of endogenous variables V over random samples of U in Figure 1

Wouter van Amsterdam – WvanAmsterdam – vanamsterdam.github.io



Calculating a treatment effect in a fully specified probabilistic causal model

take random samples from U, push forward through submodel7 and submodel3

```
1 \# N = 1e3
 2 # us <- map(1:N, ~sample u())
  3
 4 v3s <- map(us, ~do.call(submodel3, as.list(.x)))</pre>
 5 v7s <- map(us, ~do.call(submodel7, as.list(.x)))</pre>
  6
    v3df <- v3s |> map(~data.table(t(.x))) |> rbindlist()
    v7df <- v7s |> map(~data.table(t(.x))) |> rbindlist()
   v3df[, idx:=.I]
  9
    v7df[, idx:=.I]
10
11
    dfa <- rbindlist(list(</pre>
12
13
     scm1=vdf,
     submodel3=v3df,
14
      submodel7=v7df
15
16 ), idcol='model')
17
    dfa[. list(mean survival=mean(survival)). by="model"]
18
       model mean survival
      <char>
                      <num>
                   8.489856
        scm1
1:
2: submodel3
                   3.637293
                                           Wouter van Amsterdam - WvanAmsterdam - vanamsterdam.github.io
3: submodel7
                   7.637293
```





Identification



Recap of definitions

- Structural Causal model:
 - endogenous variables V
 - exogenous (noise) variables U
 - deterministic functions f_i(pa_i,u_i)
- Effect of Action do(T = t): submodel where f_T replaced with fixed value t
- Probabilistic Causal Model: SCM + distribution over U



In the real world

- knowing the SCM is a super-power: you basically know everything revelant about the system, but in the real world:
- we do not observe U
- we typically do not know f_
 - we may be willing to place assumptions on f (e.g. generalized linear models)
- we are presented with realizations V_i of this SCM over a random sample of U
 - this is another assumption on the sampling but this is largely orthogonal to causal inference
- we may be interest in knowing:
 - 1. what is the expected survival time if we *always* admit patients for exactly 7 days?

When and how might we learn the answer to such questions?



Identification

Causal effect identification:



Definition 3.2.3 (Identifiability)

Let Q(M) be any computable quantity of a model M.

We say that Q is **identifiable** in a class M of models if, for any pairs of models M_1 and M_2 from Μ,

 $Q(M_1) = Q(M_2)$ whenever $P_{M_1}(y) = P_{M_2}(y)$.

If our observations are limited and permit only a partial set F_M of features (of $P_M(y)$) to be estimated,

we define Q to be identifiable from F_M if $Q(M_1) = Q(M_2)$ whenever $F_{M_1} = F_{M_2}$.



Idenfitication in pictures

Someone killed the priest (†), we want to know who-dunnit (= Q)

Based on prior knowledge we have 5 suspects (all the SCMs compatible with our DAG)



If we had full data, we would know it was M_3



Idenfitication in pictures

Someone killed the priest (†), we want to know who-dunnit (= Q) Based on prior knowledge on 5 suspects (all the SCMs compatible with our DAG)



If we had full data, we would have know it was M_3

Unfortunately, it was dark an we only got a gray-scale image of the perpetrator All our suspects (models) lead to the same partial observations Based on observed data and assumptions we cannot identify the answer to our question Q, i.e. multiple models with different answers for Q fit the observed data equally well



Not identified vs estimand



The backdoor adjustment in this DAG means the correct estimand is:

$$P(Y|\operatorname{do}(T)) = \sum_{z} P(Y|T, z)P(Z = z)$$

- If we did not observe Z, we could still come up with a latent-variable model for Z and a model for Y | T, Z and get a value.
- However, we can formulate multiple distinct latent variable models that each yield a different treatment effect (i.e. the output of the estimand)
- But these latent variable models all fit the *observed* data equally well
- So we cannot identify the treatment effect



Seeing is not doing





- $P(Y|do(T)) \neq P(Y|T)$ is Pearl's definition of confounding (def 6.2.1)
- this shows why RCTs are special (i.e. no backdoor paths into T)

Figure 4: ² because in the intervened DAG, Z is independent of T



Another path to identification: parametric assumptions

- for example:
 - assumption 1: M_1 , all SCMs with same DAG
 - assumption 2: M₂ SCMs with linear functions and Gaussian error terms
 - assumption 1+2: $M = M_1 \cap M_2$ (DAG + linear gaussian)
- many more effects are identified in this setting
- 'works' with unobserved confounding, positivity violations
- caveats:
 - much harder to determine identifyability (no analogue of backdoor-rule)
 - prefer weaker assumptions over stronger assumption



Defining counterfactuals and the causal hierarchy (of questions)

Wouter van Amsterdam — WvanAmsterdam — vanamsterdam.github.io



Counterfactuals

- all of the above can be achieved with DAGs, but we haven't used SCMs *unique power* yet: counterfactuals
- RCT / DAG questions: What is the expected survival if we keep all patients in the hospital for 7 days?



Take it one level higher: counterfactuals

For patient Adam we had this data:

- surgery duration: 4 hours
- length of stay: 3 days
- survival: 4 years

For patient Zoe we had this data:

- surgery duration: 4 hours
- length of stay: 3 days
- survival: 7.5 years

- we do not observe Adam's/Zoe's U
- What would the expected survival have been had Adam/Zoe been kept in the hospital for 7 days?



Adam versus Zoe

- Average causal effects in subgroup with surgery=4:
 - 3-days LOS: 5.5
 - 7-days LOS: 9.5



• what do we expect for Adam and Zoe if they would have been kept in the hospital for 7 days?

Wouter van Amsterdam – WvanAmsterdam – vanamsterdam.github.io





Computing counterfactuals with SCMs

• Given our information on the structural equation for survival (Section 2.2):

survival = $los - 2 * surgery + u_{survival}$

- and observed values on Adam's and Zoe's surgery AND survival following los=3
- we can compute their individual $u_{survival}$:

| patient | surgery | los | survival | u_survival |
|---------|---------|-----|----------|------------|
| Adam | 4 | 3 | 4 | 9 |
| Zoe | 4 | 3 | 7.5 | 12.5 |

and (counterfactual) survival under 7 days LOS

survival7

8

11.5



Computing counterfactuals

- notation: $P(Y_{t'} = y' | T = t, Y = y)$ where $Y_{t'}$ means "set T = t' through intervention"
- steps:
 - 1. Abduction (update P(U) from observed evidence)
 - 2. Action (modify the treatment)
 - 3. Prediction (calculate outcomes in submodel, putting in the updated P(U))



Pearl's Causal Hierarchy (of questions)

If you have data to solve the upper, you can solve the lower ranks too (Bareinboim et al. 2022)

- 1. counterfactuals
- 2. interventions
- 3. associations



Where do we get this knowledge from?

- not from observational data
- not from RCTs
- from assumptions
- can get bounds from combinations of RCT data and observational data
- caveat: some say the hierarchy is upside down because you go further away from data and closer to unverifiable assumptions the 'higher' you get

l data rther away from data and



Not covered but also possible:

- DAGs:
 - *soft intervention*: don't set treatment to fixed value but replace function with other function of variables
 - express patterns for missing data by including missingness indicators
- SCMs:
 - probability of sufficiency
 - probability of necessity



References

Bareinboim, Elias, Juan Correa, Duligur Ibeling, and Thomas Icard. 2022. "On Pearl's Hierarchy and the Foundations of Causal Inference (1st Edition)." In *Probabilistic and Causal Inference: The Works of Judea Pearl*, edited by Hector Geffner, Rita Dechter, and Joseph Halpern, 507–56. ACM Books.

Pearl, Judea, ed. 2009. "The Logic of Structure-Based Counterfactuals." In *Causality*, 2nd ed., 201–58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511803161.009.

